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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bradley Joseph Vanzant appeals from the district court’s judgment 
affirming the magistrate’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Vanzant with Domestic Battery in the Presence of a 
Child and Driving Without Privileges, third offense.  (R., p. 229.)  Vanzant hired 
private counsel, Ms. Maloney.  (Id.)   
On May 2, 2013, the day scheduled for jury trial, the court reset the trial 
because “Court is in day 2 of another trial, [defense counsel] unavailable.”  (R., 
p. 62.)  At the May 2, 2013 hearing, Vanzant was represented by Mr. Stoppello, 
who was appearing for Ms. Maloney.  (Id.)   
On May 23, 2013, Vanzant signed a written plea deal.  (R., p. 64.)  The 
Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child was amended to Intentional 
Destruction of a Telecommunication Line or Telecommunication Instrument, and 
the Driving Without Privileges, third offense, was dismissed.  (R., pp. 64, 229.)  
The state agreed to recommend two years unsupervised probation, waive fines 
and recommend 180 days of jail with 165 days suspended and credit for 15 days 
served.  (R., p. 64.)  The magistrate followed the plea agreement.  (R., p. 65.)   
Months later, Vanzant moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he 
discovered that Ms. Maloney had been charged with Driving Under the Influence 
during the pendency of his case.  (R., pp. 66-70, 229-230.)  The magistrate 
denied the motion, holding that Vanzant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently and 
 2 
voluntarily made.  (R., p. 70.)  Vanzant appealed to the district court and the 
district court affirmed the magistrate court.  (R., p. 72-79.)  The district court held, 
in part: 
The court finds that [the magistrate] did not abuse his discretion in 
denying Mr. Vanzant’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Mr. Vanzant has not demonstrated that Ms. Maloney’s performance 
was affected by her pending criminal charges, nor has he even 
attempted to do so. 
 
(R., p. 78.)  
 
Vanzant filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp. 4-9.)  Vanzant claimed that Ms. Maloney’s 
representation was ineffective because of her pending Driving Under the 
Influence charge, and alleged she failed to investigate medical records regarding 
Vanzant’s knee.  (Id.)   
The magistrate appointed post-conviction counsel, and, with the court’s 
permission, Vanzant filed an Amended Verified Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief.  (R., pp. 38-46.)  The state answered.  (R., pp. 47-80.) The magistrate 
gave a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Vanzant’s petition.  (R., p. 81.)  The 
state also filed a motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp. 83-91.)  
Vanzant filed a Second Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief.  (R., 
pp. 92-105.)  Vanzant also filed an Affidavit in Support of his Second Verified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief.  (R., pp. 106-108.)  Vanzant filed a response 
to the magistrate’s notice of intent and to the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal.  (R., pp. 109-134.)  The magistrate entered an order summarily 
dismissing Vanzant’s petition, holding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
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was raised on direct appeal and could not be re-litigated in a post-conviction 
proceeding.  (R. pp. 135-136.)  Vanzant appealed to the district court.  (R., pp. 
138-140.)   
On intermediate appeal, the district court first determined that Vanzant’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not considered on his direct appeal 
and thus could be raised in his post-conviction petition.  (R., pp. 233-234.)  The 
district court then considered Vanzant’s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and found all of his claims to be conclusory and that Vanzant failed to 
establish he was prejudiced by his counsel’s pending criminal charge.  (R., pp. 
235-241.) The district court affirmed the magistrate’s order of summary 
dismissal.  (R., pp. 229-242.)  Vanzant timely appealed.  (R., pp. 246-248.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Vanzant states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether the District Court Erred in Affirming the Summary 
Dismissal of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 2.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Vanzant failed to show the district court erred when it affirmed the 
magistrate’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition?   
 5 
ARGUMENT 
 
Vanzant Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Affirmed The 
Magistrate’s Dismissal Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
 Vanzant has failed to show the district court erred when it affirmed the 
magistrate’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  Vanzant failed to make a 
prima facie showing that his counsel’s pending Driving Under the Influence 
charge caused any deficient performance by his counsel.  Vanzant also failed to 
make a prima facie showing of any resulting prejudice or that it would have been 
rational for him to reject the very favorable plea deal he received from the state.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate 
capacity, the Idaho appellate courts directly review the district court’s decision. 
State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009).  The 
appellate courts are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the 
district court.  State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 
2014); Pentico v. State, 159 Idaho 350, __, 159 P.3d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 2015).   
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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C. Vanzant Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It 
Determined That Vanzant’s Petition Was Supported By Mere Conclusory 
Assertions 
 
The district court affirmed the magistrate’s summary dismissal of 
Vanzant’s petition for post-conviction relief because Vanzant’s petition was not 
supported by admissible evidence and his allegations were only supported by 
mere conclusory assertions.  (R., pp. 235-241.)  On appeal, Vanzant has failed 
to show the district court erred.   
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications 
for post-conviction relief.”  Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.  “A 
court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § 19-4906(c), or may 
dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. § 19-4906(b).”  Id.  Summary 
disposition of a post-conviction petition “is appropriate if the applicant’s evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact.”  Id. at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b),(c)).  “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant 
must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).   
“When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe 
disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required to accept 
either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law.”  Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 
791, 796, 291 P.3d 474, 479 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
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548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 
P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994)).  “Moreover, because the district court rather than 
a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court is not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner’s favor, but is free to 
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  Id. (citing 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2007); Wolf v. State, 
152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Hayes v. State, 146 
Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008)). 
In order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner “must establish that: (1) a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a material 
issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant’s case.”  
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U .S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
To establish deficient performance the petitioner must overcome the 
strong presumption that trial counsel performed within the wide range of 
professional assistance by proving trial counsel’s actions fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382, 247 
P.3d 582, 609 (2010); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 
1989).  To meet this burden “requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  The applicant 
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bears a heavy burden in proving that his attorney’s performance was deficient.  
Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248.   
To satisfy the prejudice element, where the petitioner was convicted upon 
a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.  Popoca-Garcia v. State, 157 Idaho 150, 152, 334 P.3d 824, 
826 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 
(Ct. App. 2006)).  “In order to obtain relief, a petitioner must show that a decision 
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”  
Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho 234, 239, 345 P.3d 1024, 1029 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).  All of Vanzant’s claims 
fail both prongs. 
1. Vanzant Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His 
Counsel’s Pending Criminal Charge Resulted In A Lack Of 
Preparation That Caused A Deficient Performance And Resulting 
Prejudice 
 
 On May 2, 2013, the magistrate continued Vanzant’s trial because “Court 
is in day 2 of another trial, [defense counsel] unavailable.”  (R., p. 62.)  Vanzant 
alleged his counsel was unavailable because she had been arrested for DUI and 
that arrest meant she was unprepared.  (R., pp. 94-95, 236.)  The district court 
summarily dismissed this claim because it was a mere conclusory statement:  
a. Preparation 
 
As set forth in the Statement of Issues, the appellant 
contends “Ms. Maloney was not prepared to proceed with Mr. 
Vanzant’s trial on May 2, 2013 as she had been arrested and 
incarcerated on an alcohol related charge that morning. That lack 
of preparation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness 
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and caused the Petitioner to be concerned about a competent 
defense at trial and contributed to his involuntary decision to plead 
guilty. Although Petitioner was unaware of Ms. Maloney’s criminal 
conduct at the time he entered his guilty plea, he was concerned 
about a competent defense at trial due to the continuance which 
contributed to his involuntary decision to plead guilty.” Second 
Verified Amended Petition for Post-Conviction, at 4. 
 
These are conclusory allegations. Further, the trial was 
continued, resulting in no immediate prejudice to the appellant. The 
appellant subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement 
with what appears to be very favorable terms for him.  He was not 
forced to accept the terms at the time of the initial trial setting when 
concerns would have been understandable. 
 
(R., p. 236.)   
On appeal, Vanzant argues that his counsel’s arrest, “fell below the 
objective standard of reasonableness” and caused him prejudice “because he 
became concerned about the ability to receive a competent defense at trial” and 
because he was not consulted about the trial reset.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  
Vanzant’s argument fails for at least two reasons.  First, Vanzant failed to show 
that the trial being continued on May 2nd was somehow an error of his counsel.  
According to the record, the magistrate continued Vanzant’s trial for two reasons, 
“Court is in day 2 of another trial, [defense counsel] unavailable.”  (R., p. 62.)  
The continuance was not entirely due to his defense counsel’s unavailability.  
Vanzant only showed that his counsel was arrested (see R., pp. 102-03), but he 
failed to produce any evidence that the arrest resulted in any actual deficient 
performance by his counsel.  Further, Vanzant failed to present any evidence 
that the continuance prejudiced him.  The trial was continued, and prior to trial, 
Vanzant received a very favorable plea deal.  Because Vanzant failed to make a 
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prima facie showing of either Strickland prong he has failed to show the district 
court erred.  
2. Vanzant Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Investigating Unrelated Medical 
Records  
 
 Vanzant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating 
the “Veteran’s Administration records regarding issues with his knee and his 
medication” because “[t]he issues with Mr. Vanzant’s knee would have shown to 
a jury that he was unable to commit the acts that [the victim] claimed occurred.”  
(R., pp. 94-95.)  The district court reviewed this allegation and held that Vanzant 
only made conclusory allegations and did not explain how these unspecified 
medical records regarding his knee would have provided a defense:   
The appellant does not specify how any knee issues would 
have prevented him from using his hands to strike [the victim] with 
the brace. He also does not specify how this would negate his 
admission to the investigating officer that he did strike [the victim] 
with his brace, but it was not intentional. See Boise Police 
Department Supplemental Report, at 3 (DR# 2012-22940): 
“Vanzant admitted to swinging around and striking her with his 
knee brace on her leg ... Vanzant clarified to me that he 
inadvertently struck her on the leg with his brace and that he didn’t 
mean for it to happen.” 
 
The appellant’s contentions are conclusory. He has not 
specified what these medical records were and how they would 
have demonstrated that he could not have committed the domestic 
battery offense. 
 
(R., p. 237.)   
On appeal, Vanzant merely reiterates the same argument rejected by the 
district court.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  In both his petition and brief on 
appeal, Vanzant does not explain what his knee issues were or how those issues 
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would have prevented him from using his hands to strike the victim or somehow 
negate his admissions to the officer.  (See R., p. 237; Appellants brief, p. 8.)  Nor 
has he shown how these knee issues related to the charge to which he actually 
pled guilty.  Vanzant never provided his medical records as part of his post-
conviction petition.  Vanzant has failed to show his counsel erred by not 
“investigating” these unspecified and unrelated knee issues.  Vanzant failed to 
support this conclusory allegation and the district court did not err when it 
summarily dismissed this claim.   
3. Vanzant Failed To Show Any Conflict Of Interest Or That Any 
Conflict Would Constitute Deficient Performance  
 
Vanzant alleged that Ms. Maloney had a conflict of interest because she 
was facing a DUI charge, and Mr. Stoppello, who represented Vanzant at the 
continued May 2nd hearing, had a conflict because he was also representing Ms. 
Maloney.  (R., pp. 95, 107.)  Regarding Mr. Stoppello, Vanzant alleged:  
21. Ms. Maloney [defense counsel] did not provide effective 
assistance of counsel when she had another attorney appear in her 
place without the prior agreement of Mr. Vanzant. Further, Mr. 
Vanzant was never apprised of the potential conflict of interest that 
Mr. Stoppello was representing Mr. Vanzant at the same or nearly 
the same time as his attorney, Ms. Maloney. 
 
(R., p. 95.)  Vanzant’s supporting affidavit alleged: 
12. I was not consulted about Mr. Stoppello appearing on Ms. 
Maloney’s behalf on May 2, 2013. I did not consent to his 
appearance on my case. 
 
(R., p. 107.)  The district court held that this assertion regarding Mr. Stoppello 
was conclusory and did not articulate how Vanzant was prejudiced.  (R., pp. 237-
238.) 
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This assertion is also conclusory.  It is not clear how this 
situation prejudiced him in the outcome of his cases.  Given the 
favorable terms of his plea agreement, which he agreed to, the 
assertion of prejudice from this purported “potential conflict” is not 
reasonable.  
 
(R., p. 238.)   
On appeal, Vanzant argues that because Mr. Stoppello was prevented 
from sharing information regarding Ms. Maloney’s pending DUI with Vanzant at 
the May 2nd hearing, due to attorney-client privilege, this created an 
impermissible conflict.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  This argument fails on several 
levels.  First, Vanzant has failed to show that Mr. Stoppello was representing Ms. 
Maloney on May 2nd.  According to Vanzant’s exhibits, Mr. Stoppello made his 
appearance in Ms. Maloney’s case on May 6, 2013.  (R., p. 19.)  Second, even if 
Mr. Stoppello were representing Ms. Maloney on May 2, 2013, Vanzant has 
failed to show how the public records of Mr. Stoppello’s representation and Ms. 
Maloney’s arrest would be protected by attorney-client privilege.  Finally, as the 
district court pointed out, it is “not clear how this situation prejudiced [Vanzant] in 
outcome of his cases.”  (R., p. 238.)  Mr. Stoppello appeared in Vanzant’s case 
only once, at the May 2, 2013 hearing where the magistrate continued the trial 
because of the court’s schedule and Ms. Maloney’s unavailability.  (R., p. 62.)  
Vanzant has failed, both below and on appeal, to show Mr. Stoppello had any 
sort of conflict of interest or that a conflict prejudiced Vanzant.   
 Vanzant also alleged that he did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel because Ms. Maloney “did not discuss the potential conflict of interest 
that she had a pending criminal law violation in the same jurisdiction as Mr. 
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Vanzant at the same time his case was pending.”  (R., p. 95.)  Vanzant 
elaborated on this claim in his supporting affidavit, as follows: 
11. I was not informed that Ms. Maloney had a pending criminal 
case at the time she was representing me. If l had known I would 
have ended Ms. Maloney’s representation. I believe there was a 
conflict of interest in Ms. Maloney having a pending criminal case at 
the same time that she represented me. 
 
(R., p. 107.)  The district court dismissed this claim on the basis it was 
conclusory. 
This assertion is also conclusory.  The appellant has not 
specified how he was prejudiced by this “potential conflict of 
interest.”  It is not apparent that there is a reasonable probability 
that he would have insisted on going to trial rather than accept the 
plea bargain.  
 
(R., p. 238.)   
On appeal, Vanzant again argues that if he had known about Ms. 
Maloney’s DUI charge, he would have ended her representation and sought 
other counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  Vanzant’s argument again fails to 
establish that Ms. Maloney did anything that rendered her performance deficient.  
Vanzant does not point to any law that requires an attorney to inform her clients 
regarding all of her interactions with law enforcement.  Nor do the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct prevent an attorney from practicing law in a county in 
which she is a party to an unrelated legal case.  See I.R.P.C. 1.7, 1.8.  Vanzant 
has failed to establish Ms. Maloney’s performance was in any way deficient.   
 Further, Vanzant has failed to show he was prejudiced.  The district court 
provided a detailed examination of the charges and facts against Vanzant. (R., 
pp. 238-240.)  There was substantial evidence of Vanzant’s guilt.  (See R., pp. 
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169-172, 238-240.)  Vanzant failed to allege, much less present any evidence to 
show that it would have been rational for him to reject the plea bargain under the 
circumstances. See Keserovic, 158 Idaho at 239, 345 P.3d at 1029.  On appeal, 
Vanzant argues that because Vanzant had served his sentence before filing his 
petition, it would now be rational for him to reject the plea bargain: 
The District Court’s reasoning was that Vanzant would not have 
gone to trial on more serious charges but have accepted the plea 
offer because of the reduced exposure to charges and penalties.  
This reasoning, however, does not consider that Vanzant had 
already served his sentence at the time he filed his petition.   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Vanzant’s argument fails because he must show that it 
would have been rational for him to reject the plea offer, at the time of plea offer, 
not at the time he filed his post conviction petition.1  See e.g. Keserovic, 158 
Idaho at 239, 345 P.3d at 1029; Icanovic v. State, __ Idaho ___, 2015 WL 
9315740, at *6 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2015).   
As the district court pointed out, Vanzant received “a plea agreement with 
what appears to be very favorable terms for him.”  (R., p. 236.)  The state 
amended the Domestic Battery in Presence of a Child to Interference with a 911 
call, and dismissed the Driving Without Privileges, third offense. (R., p. 177.)  
The state also agreed to waive fines, and to recommend unsupervised 
probation, credit for time served and suspension of the balance of his jail 
sentence.  (Id.)  Vanzant has failed to show that it would have been rational 
under the circumstances for him to reject this very favorable plea bargain.  
                                            
1 It is also not rational for Vanzant to reject the plea deal after he served his 
sentence, because vacating the plea deal and conviction would again subject 
Vanzant to additional charges and penalties.   
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Vanzant has failed to show any conflict of interest that caused his attorneys to 
perform deficiently and failed to show any prejudice.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
judgment affirming the magistrate’s summary dismissal of Vanzant’s post-
conviction petition.   
 DATED this 16th day of February, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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